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Foreword 
 
Between March and May 1995 the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
sponsored a thematic seminar series titled ‘Policy Aspects of Native Title’. The 
following eight seminars were presented: 
 
• ‘Relative allocative efficiency of the Native Title Act 1993 and the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1976’ by Siobahn McKenna (March). 
 
• ‘Resource development agreements on Aboriginal land in the 1990s: features 
and trends’ by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh (March). 
 
• ‘Negotiations between Aboriginal communities and Mining companies: 
structures and process’ by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh (April). 
 
• ‘Tourism enterprise and native title: the Tjapukai Dance Theatre, Cairns’ by 
Julie Finlayson (April). 
 
• ‘Funding native title claims: establishing equitable procedures’ by Jon Altman 
and Diane Smith (April). 
 
• ‘Native title and land management’ by Elspeth Young and Helen Ross (April). 
 
• ‘Native Title Act 1993: latest developments and implementation issues for 
resource developers’ by Jon Altman (May). 
 
• ‘Native title and regional agreements: the Kimberley case’ by Patrick Sullivan 
(May). 
 
Five of these seminars have now been revised into CAEPR Discussion Papers Nos 
85-89. Of the others, Siobahn McKenna’s seminar was published earlier as CAEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 79 and Jon Altman and Diane Smith’s seminar was published 
as ‘Funding Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Representative Bodies under the 
Native Title Act 1993’ (Issues Paper No. 8, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native 
Title).  
 
Owing to the pressing public policy significance of the issues addressed in this series, 
these discussion papers are intentionally exploratory and aim to disseminate 
information to a wider audience than that able to attend the seminars at the Australian 
National University. 
 
 
 
Jon Altman 
Series Editor 
July 1995 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes and critically examines five resource development agreements 
signed between mining companies and Aboriginal communities between 1992 and 
1994 in the Northern Territory and north Queensland. These include the Mt Todd 
Agreement, the McArthur River Agreement, the Cape Flattery-Hope Vale 
Agreement, the Mapoon-Skardon River Agreement and the Placer Pacific-Kalkadoon 
Tribal Council Agreement. It also discusses the general approach adopted by the 
Northern Land Council in the Northern Territory to negotiating exploration licence 
agreements under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. The 
paper updates a somewhat dated literature that examines a series of mineral 
development agreements negotiated between Aboriginal interests and mining 
companies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also analyses the broader context 
within which the five recent agreements examined were negotiated and assesses the 
purposes and contents of the agreements themselves. In conclusion, the author 
comments on the broader political significance of some general trends that emerge 
from the cases considered and suggests criteria for evaluating these agreements. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of mineral development agreements1 
were negotiated between Aboriginal communities and mining companies or relevant 
government agencies (Altman 1983; Christensen 1983; Gray 1980). Between 1983 
and 1991, few such agreements were signed, mainly due to development restrictions 
imposed by the Federal Government, particularly in relation to uranium mining; 
because of administrative problems associated with the operation of the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (hereafter Land Rights Act), and because 
a prolonged period of depressed mineral prices in the mid-1980s discouraged mineral 
exploration and development in north Australia. During recent years a substantial 
number of mineral development agreements have again been concluded by 
Aboriginal communities and organisations, particularly in the Northern Territory and 
Queensland, and more are currently (June 1995) under negotiation.  
 
Publication of up-to-date information on mineral development agreements is 
important because it allows Aboriginal organisations and communities to use positive 
precedents established elsewhere in seeking to maximise the benefits they achieve 
from mineral exploitation. This information also assists Aboriginal people and mining 
companies in attempting to reach mutually acceptable responses to potential problems 
associated with mineral exploration and development. However, while some recent 
agreements have received considerable attention in the media, very little information 
is available about other agreements because they often contain confidentiality clauses. 
In addition, there has been no attempt to develop a general overview of the sorts of 
agreements which are emerging from contemporary negotiations between Aboriginal 
people and mining companies, or to examine their broader significance for public 
policy or for relations between the mining industry and Australia’s indigenous 
people.  
 
This paper examines a number of individual agreements made between 1992 and 
1994, and also discusses the general approach being adopted by the Northern Land 
Council (NLC) in negotiating exploration licence agreements under the Land Rights 
Act. The original intention was also to discuss agreements negotiated by the Central 
Land Council (CLC). However, to date no response has been received to two written 
requests, and a number of verbal requests, asking the CLC to provide relevant 
information.  
 
In each case, information is provided on the context within which mineral 
development agreements were negotiated, and on the purpose and content of the 
agreements themselves. The conclusion comments on the broader political 
significance of some general trends which emerge from the analysis of individual 
agreements, and also suggests some criteria on which these agreements can be 
evaluated.  
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Northern Land Council exploration licence agreements 
 
The Land Rights Act, as amended in 1987, obliges a mining company which has 
obtained a right  from the Northern Territory Minister for Mines to explore on 
Aboriginal land, to lodge an exploration licence application with the relevant land 
council within three months. In doing so the company is also required to provide a 
detailed outline of its proposed exploration program and of any potential 
environmental and social impacts. When a land council receives a licence application 
a ‘negotiation period’ commences, which is normally 12 months. Within 30 days of 
receiving an application the land council must notify any Aboriginal group or 
community, including any traditional owners, that may be affected by the grant of a 
licence, and subsequently consult with them concerning the exploration proposals and 
the terms and conditions to which any grant should be subject. On the basis of these 
consultations the land council must, before the ‘negotiating period’ expires, either 
consent or refuse to consent to the application. If consent is given, the traditional 
owners cannot subsequently deny the licence holder a mining right in the licence 
area. In other words, the Land Rights Act does not allow disjunctive agreements 
which require the granting of consent separately in relation to exploration and, at a 
later point in time, to mining. Disjunctive agreements were permitted prior to the 
amendment of the Land Rights Act in 1987. 
 
Where the land council does not refuse its consent but fails to reach agreement with 
the applicant regarding terms and conditions for grant of a licence, provision is made 
for conciliation and, if this fails, for arbitration. The outcome of any arbitration is 
binding on the land council and on traditional owners. If a holder of an exploration 
licence wishes to proceed to mining, the procedure is almost identical to that involved 
in processing an application to explore. The key difference, of course, is that while an 
exploration licence agreement (ELA) can be rejected, a mining lease application 
cannot.2  
 
The NLC felt that the 1987 amendments placed Aboriginal landowners in an 
invidious and indeed ridiculous position, requiring them to approve mining at a stage 
when virtually no information was available on what it would entail, and denying 
them a key bargaining factor (the power to withhold consent) when they negotiated 
terms and conditions for granting of mining leases. The Council initially believed that 
while it could no longer insist on disjunctive agreements, it could still conclude such 
agreements under the Land Rights Act if mining companies were willing to do so. 
However, the Northern Territory Government mounted a successful legal challenge 
against an agreement negotiated in this way. The NLC then attempted, without 
success, to have the Land Rights Act changed so as to again allow disjunctive 
agreements.  
 
It is against this background that the NLC has, since late 1993, developed and applied 
its current approach to negotiation of ELAs.3 Some ten ELAs have been concluded to 
date and a number of others are currently under negotiation. The basic aims of the 
approach are twofold: 
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i. to ensure that traditional owners gain some benefit from mineral exploration 
activity on their land, and to minimise any adverse effects from exploration 
activity; 
 
ii. to provide as much certainty as possible regarding the general parameters 
which will apply to the development of any commercial mineral deposits 
which are discovered. This ensures, to the extent feasible, that traditional 
owners know what they are committing themselves to, and what sorts of 
benefits they can expect, when they consent to exploration.    
 
The mechanism developed by the NLC is a standard form contract for an ELA, which 
is then modified through a process of consultation and negotiation to take into 
account the specific needs and concerns of particular traditional owners and mining 
companies. Since conditions relating to mining cannot be included in the ELA itself, 
a set of ‘mutually agreed mining parameters’ are negotiated and placed in an 
Appendix. These parameters (discussed below) seek to establish general principles 
which will govern mining on Aboriginal land and give a specific indication of the 
benefits which traditional owners can expect to achieve (for example in relation to 
compensation payments). However they also leave some leeway for adjustments 
when the terms and conditions are negotiated for the granting of a mining lease, by 
which time much more information is available to traditional owners and the mining 
company. 
 
The ‘mutually agreed mining parameters’ are unlikely to be enforceable through the 
courts, given that they have no legislative base under the Land Rights Act. Thus a 
mining company could, in theory, insist that completely new terms and conditions be 
negotiated for granting of a mining lease. It would be unlikely to do so, given its 
desire to obtain landowner approval and to avoid the delays involved in conciliation 
and arbitration. However to strengthen the legal position of landowners, a joint 
venture contract is negotiated between an Aboriginal corporation, representing the 
traditional owners, and the mining company involved. This contract incorporates the 
same ‘mining parameters’ included in the ELA appendix, and is concluded outside 
the framework of the Land Rights Act.  
 
As indicated above, the specific provisions of individual ELAs and the related 
‘mining parameters’ vary. The following discussion provides a general indication of 
their context.  
 
ELAs usually provide for traditional owners to achieve a (free) equity position in any 
project developed as a result of exploration on their land (usually 5 per cent, but 
possibly higher depending on the company involved). There may also be provisions 
for the developer to help owners increase their equity if mining proceeds, for 
example, through provision of an interest-free loan or through an issue of equity 
financed from royalty income foregone by traditional owners.  
 
The agreements also contain a range of provisions designed to ensure protection of 
the environment and sites of significance and to minimise the possibility of adverse 
social impacts. These include an arrangement whereby traditional owners, though 
minority shareholders in a project, have a majority of voting rights in regard to 
decisions on, for example, management of significant sites or access to alcohol. It is 
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usually agreed that a ‘fly-in fly-out’ mode of development will be utilised, as opposed 
to the development of a conventional township and associated facilities, helping to 
minimise both social and environmental impacts. More specific environmental issues 
are also dealt with, such as water containment and pit rehabilitation.  
 
Liaison committees are established to maintain communication between owners and 
the company during the exploration stage and to supervise site clearance and approve 
work programs at the beginning of each year. Once mining commences, the developer 
pays an agreed administration fee to the NLC. Part of this fee funds the monitoring of 
environmental, cultural and social impacts by land council officers and traditional 
owners.  
 
Financial compensation received by traditional owners during the exploration stage is 
modest, and is related to the extent of exploration activity. If a mine is developed, 
compensation is paid during the construction phase, reflecting the fact that this often 
involves extensive physical and social disruption. Payments usually amount to about 
1 per cent of construction costs. The fiscal regime which will apply to mining varies 
from case to case both in terms of the level of payments and their method of 
calculation, for example, because of the nature of the minerals being sought. The 
regime may also be subject to further negotiation when terms and conditions are 
agreed for a mining lease. The NLC would certainly expect this to occur if, say, 
exploration yielded an unexpectedly valuable deposit, and seeks to include provisions 
which provide it with a capacity to achieve such an outcome. Conversely, the ‘mining 
parameters’ may include a provision which sets a ceiling on the royalty payments a 
company could incur during the early phase of a project. 
 
The fiscal regime usually involves a negotiated (non-statutory) royalty equivalent to 
about 2-3 per cent ad valorem (i.e. of the value of mineral sales). There is also 
provision for annual rental payments, related to the area of land involved, but 
typically expected to yield about $100,000 per annum. One reason for seeking rentals 
is to provide at least a modicum of stability in the income accruing to traditional 
owners in a context where sharp changes in output or prices can dramatically affect 
royalty income, for instance, as has occurred during recent years with Ranger 
Uranium Mines. The provision of equity can also represent an important source of 
income for traditional owners if projects prove to be profitable.  
 
Employment opportunities for local Aboriginal people are limited during mineral 
exploration, but companies usually give a general commitment to make the maximum 
possible use of local labour. With reference to the construction and mining phases, 
the ‘mining parameters’ tend to focus on the principles which will govern company 
policy and practice, rather than on specifying particular activities or levels of 
employment. For example, companies are expected to initiate training programs for 
local Aboriginal people as early as possible in project development, to increase their 
capacity to take advantage of employment opportunities available at the mining stage. 
They also make a commitment to train, as far as is practicable, interested local people 
to fill permanent positions at all levels in the mining operation. It is assumed that 
more detailed provisions regarding employment and training would be developed as 
part of the terms and conditions for mining leases. The mining parameters also 
include a preference clause in relation to awarding of contracts to local suppliers.  
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The Mt Todd Agreement 
 
During 1991 and 1992 Zapopan NL undertook exploration on land which had earlier 
been the subject of an unsuccessful claim by Jawoyn people under the Land Rights 
Act, and which was now the subject of a repeat claim. The company had talked to the 
Jawoyn regarding protection of sacred sites, but had not sought their permission to 
mine or offered them specific benefits from the development. As with other mining 
projects, the Mt Todd development received strong support from the Northern 
Territory Government, but it also had the backing of the Federal Government under 
its ‘fast-tracking’ initiative, designed to expedite development of major projects so as 
to stimulate employment and exports.  
 
The Jawoyn had, over previous years, entered into a number of co-management and 
commercial arrangements regarding, in particular, Nitmiluk (Katherine Gorge) 
National Park, and were keen to ensure similar arrangements in relation to Mt Todd. 
In the wake of the Mabo decision, the Jawoyn Association organised a meeting with 
Zapopan and Northern Territory Government and Federal Government 
representatives, and stated that the Jawoyn would lodge a native title claim unless the 
other parties participated in negotiations designed to ensure local Aboriginal people 
derived substantial benefits from the project. Whether successful or not, a native title 
claim was likely to cause substantial delays in project development, an outcome 
which both governments and the company were anxious to avoid. In December 1992 
the Jawoyn offered to negotiate an arrangement which would facilitate its 
development while preserving any native title rights they might have in land affected 
by the project. (In the event native title rights were not in fact preserved: see below.) 
They requested, in return, a package of benefits, including jobs and land. 
Negotiations moved quickly, and the Mt Todd Agreement was signed on 15 January 
1993.4  
 
The Mt Todd Agreement has received significant and highly favourable exposure in 
the media.5 The Federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Mr Tickner, has called it ‘a 
model for handling life after Mabo’.6 The Australian Financial Review described it as 
a ‘model deal’, and the Jawoyn Association’s Executive Officer, John Ah Kit has 
promoted it as an approach which other Aboriginal communities could follow.7  
 
It is not difficult to see why the Agreement won such widespread support. It allowed 
the Federal Government to argue that Mabo would not, as its critics suggested, 
inevitably place barriers in the way of resource development.8 It represented a 
milestone in the Northern Territory Government’s (often very poor) relations with its 
Aboriginal constituents, both because of the Government’s willingness to negotiate 
with Aboriginal traditional owners and its unprecedented action in supporting a land 
grant under the Land Rights Act (see below). It also offered encouragement to the 
reconciliation process, bringing together parties which over the last 20 years have 
been at the centre of some of the sharpest conflicts between indigenous and non-
indigenous Australians. The fact that the Jawoyn had very recently played a major 
and much-publicised role in halting development of the Coronation Hill project 
further heightened its significance in this regard.  
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However, in addition to recognising the significance of the process from which it 
emerged and its importance in countering some of the more extreme reactions to 
Mabo, it is important to assess the Mt Todd Agreement on its own terms, in other 
words, on the basis of the benefits it offers the Jawoyn and of how and by whom 
those benefits are created. 
 
The Agreement was concluded between the Northern Territory Government, Zapopan 
NL, and the Jawoyn Association. Under the Agreement, the Jawoyn agreed to 
extinguish ‘all rights in the nature of native title’ in respect of the land involved and 
to withdraw their repeat claim and not to advance or support any further repeat claims 
or native title claims. They accepted the benefits offered under the Agreement as ‘full 
and fair compensation’ for the extinguishment of all rights in the nature of native title, 
and agreed to provide support for the company’s exploration and mining activity on 
the land concerned.  
 
Under Schedules to the Agreement, the Northern Territory Government, undertook: 
 
i. to support the listing of certain areas of land held by the Jawoyn under lease 
as Aboriginal land under the Land Rights Act. This land (approximately 1,000 
square kilometres) was listed in 1994; 
 
ii. to incorporate a portion of the land in the Nitmiluk Park, and to obtain title to 
another parcel of land, issue freehold title to the Association and incorporate 
this in the Park; 
 
iii. to provide, within five years, a water supply, housing for up to six families 
and other facilities to a Jawoyn outstation and also, if the need were 
demonstrated, single men’s accommodation for Aboriginal workers at Mt 
Todd, at an estimated cost of approximately $1,000,000; 
 
iv. to complete capital works to the value of $60,000 to help develop tourist 
accommodation at Eva Valley Station; 
 
v. transfer the Nitmiluk Visitor Centre to the Association, and contract the 
Association to provide cultural advice at the Centre; 
 
vi. increase the annual rent paid to the Jawoyn for Nitmiluk Park lands from 
$115,000 to $140,000. 
 
Zapopan undertook to employ an Aboriginal employment and training officer to 
identify employment and training opportunities for Aboriginal people in connection 
with the Mt Todd project, and to establish an employment and training committee to 
oversee and promote employment and training opportunities for the Jawoyn. It also 
agreed to train five ‘suitable Aboriginal people’ to fill designated positions at the 
mine. Aboriginal employment has in fact exceeded the minimum requirements set 
down by the Agreement, and had reached 27 per cent of the workforce by April 1995. 
 
Zapopan also agreed to help establish a company owned and operated by the Jawoyn 
to provide a bus service for transporting workers to the Mt Todd site. Zapopan would 
provide, maintain and insure a bus for the service, which would become the property 
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of the Association. It undertook to provide five scholarships for Jawoyn people to 
attend non-university institutions in the Northern Territory and one to attend the 
Northern Territory University.9 
 
The parties recognise Jawoyn attachment to the land and traditional Jawoyn culture in 
the planning, development and decommissioning of the Mt Todd Project, and the 
company agreed that non-Jawoyn employees (including those of contractors) would 
be obliged to participate in a cross-cultural training and education program developed 
in consultation with the Association.   
 
The Agreement includes a rider which allows Zapopan’s directors and senior 
managers to take decisions which conflict with principles or guidelines it contains if 
they believe that such decisions are taken ‘bona fide in the best interests of Zapopan, 
its shareholders and lenders’.  
 
While the Commonwealth is not a party to the Agreement, it made a declaration to 
the effect that it supported, in principle, requests from the Jawoyn Association for 
funds to undertake a skills audit and employ staff to promote Aboriginal employment 
and training. It also expressed its support for a Jawoyn request to the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation (ATSICDC) that it give 
early consideration to proposals involving the Jawoyn Association purchasing equity 
in tourist ventures operating in Nitmiluk Park and in a contract mining operation at 
Mt Todd.   
 
Subsequent to the Agreement, the Jawoyn Association signed a joint venture 
agreement with the Henry and Walker group and the ATSICDC (which owns 8 per 
cent of Henry and Walker) to undertake contract mining. Zapopan awarded the 
contract to Henry and Walker, which passed it on to the joint venture after approval 
from Zapopan. The Jawoyn hold a 25 per cent interest in the joint venture, with the 
ATSICDC holding 25 per cent and Henry and Walker 50 per cent. The Jawoyn 
Association may eventually buy out the ATSICDC share in the joint venture.10 
 
The Mt Todd Agreement obviously offers very substantial benefits to the Jawoyn. 
However, a number of features of the Agreement may, if they are used as precedents, 
have significant and in some cases negative implications for other Aboriginal 
communities. (This point is discussed more fully in the conclusion.) First, most of the 
benefits are created as a result of government (and especially Northern Territory 
Government) commitments, rather than as a result of commitments by the developer. 
Most of the company’s initiatives involve expenditures which it would have 
undertaken in any case on economic criteria. According to Zapopan’s Executive 
Chairman, they were ‘part of the mine’s production costs’.11 Second, the Agreement 
does not include any provision for royalties or similar compensation payments, nor 
does it contain provisions relating to environmental protection, both of which were 
apparently sought by the Jawoyn. Third, the rider allowing Zapopan to take decisions 
which conflict with principles or guidelines contained in the Agreement, if such 
decisions are regarded as in the company’s best interest would seem, prima facie, to 
represent a significant potential limitation on the company’s commitments.  
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The McArthur River Agreement 
 
The McArthur River zinc/lead deposit, one of the largest in the world, is currently 
being brought into production by Mt Isa Mines (MIM) Holdings (which owns 70 per 
cent of the project) and its Japanese joint venturers. It is located near Borroloola, 
south-east of Darwin, on pastoral leases owned by MIM. The project received 
Northern Territory Government and Federal Government approvals in 1992. 
 
In February 1993 the NLC indicated that a Mabo-style claim might be lodged over 
the land on which the project was based unless MIM negotiated with local Aboriginal 
people (who in principle supported the project). The issues included employment and 
training, protection of sites of significance, compensation for damaged sites, and 
possible purchase of pastoral leases for them. In response, the Northern Territory 
Government indicated its intention to introduce legislation to prevent any such claim, 
by validating mining titles issued at McArthur River between 1975 and 1993. In May 
1993 the Federal Government, citing the national economic benefits expected to 
accrue from the project, agreed to support the Northern Territory’s legislation 
(introduced on 28 May 1993) and to pay legal costs if the legislation were challenged 
in the courts. The NLC canvassed the possibility of mounting such a challenge unless 
the legislation incorporated an agreement dealing with the concerns and aspirations of 
local Aboriginal people.12 
 
MIM initially stated that relevant approvals had been obtained and that the project 
would proceed without further negotiations, but later agreed to hold discussions with 
the NLC and traditional owners. In early June 1993 the NLC again canvassed the 
possibility of lodging a native title claim, citing failure to achieve any progress in 
talks regarding a compensation agreement. Negotiations continued for a further three 
weeks but in late June Kurdanji traditional owners rejected a proposed agreement 
offered by the Northern Territory Government, the Federal Government and MIM, 
and the NLC suspended negotiations. Under this proposal, the Kurdanji would have 
been offered 50 per cent of a joint venture pastoral operation (with MIM), based on 
land provided by the Northern Territory Government, the Federal Government and 
MIM. The traditional owners argued that the offer was far from adequate because it 
contained: 
 
i. no financial compensation; 
 
ii. no acceptable land offer as compensation (because the properties involved did 
not cover land with which the Aboriginal people had traditional affiliation); 
 
iii. no effective Aboriginal involvement in environmental monitoring or control; 
 
iv. no protection of Aboriginal native title; 
 
v. no serious attempts to monitor or ameliorate social impacts of the mine, in 
particular the effects of alcohol abuse. 
 
MIM reportedly refused to accept any Aboriginal ownership or control of land it 
currently leased, and rejected a proposal for an Aboriginal living area on the 
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McArthur River pastoral lease which would constitute less than 0.002 per cent of its 
area. MIM also refused to guarantee any jobs for Aborigines on the mining project, 
saying that it would supply only a maximum of eight training positions, and a 
maximum of five jobs as stockmen for about 16 weeks a year on its pastoral leases.13 
 
Negotiations between the NLC and MIM resumed in mid-August, and after three 
days of discussions in Brisbane the NLC announced that agreement had been reached 
with the company and that negotiations would be sought with the Northern Territory 
Government and Federal Government to agree on an overall package of measures. 
However negotiations again broke down. In the end, the McArthur River Agreement 
involved only the Commonwealth, local Aboriginal groups, and the Gurdanji-
Bingbingba Aboriginal Corporation (referred to in the Agreement as the Association); 
the NLC, MIM and the Northern Territory Government were not parties to it.   
 
Under the Agreement the Commonwealth undertook to purchase on behalf of the 
Association the Bauhinia Downs pastoral station and, through the Department of 
Employment, Education and Training (DEET), to provide an employment package 
designed to benefit residents of the McArthur River district, including Borroloola and 
Aboriginal outstations in the area. It also agreed to support ‘active consultation 
between [ATSICDC] and Members of Local Aboriginal Groups in commercial 
opportunities’.  
 
The Members of Local Aboriginal Groups accepted this arrangement: 
 
as full compensation in respect of any liability of the Commonwealth to any 
of the Members of Local Aboriginal Groups for any effect on any native title 
that might exist in the land the subject of the Mining Interests as a result of 
any act or omission of the Commonwealth relating to the granting or 
validation of the Mining Interest by the Northern Territory (Clause 4.1). 
 
MIM subsequently awarded a contract to barge McArthur River mine concentrates, 
‘strictly on a commercially competitive basis’, to a joint venture company established 
by Burns Philp Shipping and ATSICDC. Burns Philp owns 50 per cent of the joint 
venture and will manage the barging operation, and ATSICDC will progressively 
transfer its interest to local Aboriginal people.14  
 
A number of points should be made in relation to this Agreement. First, MIM’s non-
participation means that all of the costs involved fall on the Commonwealth, not on 
the company as developer of the resource. Second and more specifically, since MIM 
is not a party to it, the Agreement itself does nothing to ensure that the company will 
endeavour to make employment and training opportunities available to local 
Aboriginal people. Yet the effectiveness of the DEET employment initiative will 
depend, in part, on MIM’s attitude in this regard. Third, initiatives similar to those to 
be taken by the Commonwealth might have occurred under general policy initiatives 
in the absence of resource development. The Commonwealth is assisting Aboriginal 
groups to purchase pastoral properties elsewhere in north Australia, and DEET 
already operates a range of employment programs designed to assist Aboriginal 
people.  
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The Cape Flattery-Hope Vale Agreement 
 
Under Queensland’s Mineral Resources Act 1989, mining leases cannot be granted 
over Deed of Grant in Trust (DOGIT) land granted to Aboriginal residents of former 
mission and other reserves without the consent of either the Aboriginal Trustees of 
the land or the Governor-in-Council (effectively the Queensland Cabinet). If the 
Trustees do not reach agreement with the developer and thereby withhold their 
consent, the matter goes before the Mining Warden’s Court. The Court hears the 
developer’s lease application and objections to it and either recommends a rejection 
of the application or, through the Minister for Mines and Energy, makes a 
recommendation to the Governor-in-Council that the application be approved. In 
doing so, the Mining Warden also makes a recommendation in respect to 
compensation which should be paid to owners of the land.  
 
Cape Flattery Silica Mines (CFSM), a fully-owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi 
Corporation, has operated a silica mine at Cape Flattery, within the Hope Vale 
DOGIT, since the late 1960s. By 1990 CFSM needed an additional mining lease to 
support its operations, requiring it to seek Hope Vale’s consent; in addition, a number 
of its existing leases were due for renewal. In early 1991 the Hope Vale Community 
Council, as trustees for the DOGIT, set about accruing relevant information to 
prepare for discussions with CFSM/Mitsubishi regarding the terms of a new 
agreement. In particular, it commissioned archaeological and anthropological surveys 
of the Cape Flattery region and an Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) 
of the mine (Holden and O’Faircheallaigh 1991). The ESIA was intended to establish 
the nature of CFSM’s impact on Hope Vale over the previous 20 years, and to express 
the aspirations and concerns of Hope Vale people regarding Cape Flattery.  
 
Negotiations with CFSM/Mitsubishi commenced in August 1991, and required eight 
negotiating sessions over a period of about nine months to achieve an agreement, 
during which both Hope Vale and CFSM initiated legal proceedings to try and 
strengthen their negotiating positions. The final agreement, signed in April 1992, 
addressed most of the demands expressed by Hope Vale people through the ESIA.  
 
Under the previous compensation arrangement, Hope Vale had received a profit-
based royalty which yielded little (and at times no) income. The new Agreement 
provides for a much higher level of payments, based on an ad valorem royalty of 3 
per cent (the highest non-statutory ad valorem royalty applied to any mine currently 
operating on Aboriginal land in Australia). 
 
The Cape Flattery mine is unusual in that Aboriginal people (not all of them from 
Hope Vale) had always accounted for a high proportion of its workforce, but they had 
been concentrated in mining and milling and have largely been excluded from skilled 
jobs in maintenance as well as from administration and management. In addition, no 
Hope Vale women had been employed at the mine. The Agreement contains 
extensive provisions in relation to employment and training, designed in particular to 
extend the range of opportunities available to Hope Vale people. It contains an 
employment preference for members of the Hope Vale community, and institutes 
procedures to ensure that CFSM recruits new employees from an ‘employment list’ 
maintained by the Hope Vale Community Council. It includes specific undertakings 
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about provision of apprenticeships (two a year until a total of eight are provided, with 
this level to be maintained thereafter), and about college or university bursaries. It 
also includes undertakings to establish training programs and promotion processes 
designed to ensure that Hope Vale employees have the opportunity to attain all 
positions at Cape Flattery, including senior management positions. The Agreement 
introduces an affirmative action policy, and includes specific provisions relating to 
the provision of employment opportunities for women from Hope Vale. It provides 
for the appointment of an Aboriginal Liaison Officer at the company’s expense; this 
person will, among other things, implement the agreed recruitment procedures. The 
company also agreed to address workers’ concerns about the impact of silica dust on 
their health, by implementing a system of X-ray checks. 
 
During the ESIA numerous people complained about restrictions on their access to 
CFSM’s lease areas, in particular when they wanted to go hunting or fishing. As part 
of the Agreement the company consents, under the relevant provision of the Mineral 
Resources Act 1989, to allow Hope Vale Community members access to all parts of 
the leases other than mining and related facilities, and agrees not to unreasonably 
withhold permission to visit these latter areas. CFSM surrendered a number of its 
existing leases, and agreed to limit the extent of its new mining lease in order to 
facilitate access to areas which Hope Vale people use for fishing, hunting and 
recreation. The company also undertook to construct and help maintain a road to 
further facilitate such access, and to make available part of the land it has 
rehabilitated to facilitate the establishment of a tea-tree plantation. 
 
Another area of concern for Hope Vale people involved the impact of mining on the 
environment and on sites of significance. The Agreement provides for the application 
of an Aboriginal relations policy which requires protection of sites from mining and 
vandalism, partly through the promotion of cultural awareness and heritage protection 
among CFSM’s non-Aboriginal employees. It also provides for the creation of a 
Coordinating Committee made up of equal numbers of representatives from Hope 
Vale and CFSM. This Committee is given control over ‘environmental, historical and 
Aboriginal issues raised in association with mining and camp operations, including 
the protection of significant sites’, and also has general responsibility for monitoring 
implementation of the Agreement. There is a provision for the appointment of a 
mediator where the Coordinating Committee cannot reach agreement on an issue.  
 
Workers and their families had complained about the difficulty for family members to 
visit workers at Cape Flattery (as they live in single accommodation at the mine for 
extended periods of time), and that some Hope Vale workers in supervisory positions 
did not have their own houses at the mine, unlike non-Aboriginal supervisors. The 
Agreement explicitly agrees to visitation rights for families of employees, and 
provides that the company will make available one of the empty accommodation 
barracks in the town for use by visiting families. CFSM will ensure that Hope Vale 
workers in supervisory positions are provided with self-contained accommodation.  
 
Problems had earlier arisen at Cape Flattery in relation to the company’s role in 
enforcing camp rules and in township administration. The Agreement provides for the 
establishment of a ‘Good Order Committee’ made up of representatives from the 
Hope Vale workers, the trade union and management. This Committee’s role is to 
develop and implement camp rules and a code of social behaviour for the community 
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at Cape Flattery, and to develop a consistent response to breaches of the rules which 
have been established.   
 
The Mapoon-Skardon River Agreement 
 
Venture Exploration NL, a Perth-based company, is developing an integrated kaolin 
mining and processing project some 85 kilometres north of Weipa, on land which 
forms part of the Mapoon DOGIT. The mine site is approximately 15 km north east 
of Old Mapoon (also known as Marpuna), but is separated from it by the sea. Venture 
will mine kaolin near the headwaters of Namaleta Creek. It will then transfer it, in 
slurry form, through a pipeline to a plant near the Skardon River, 16 km north of the 
mine site, which will produce processed products. These will be barged to ocean-
going vessels moored offshore. Venture’s will be a fly-in fly-out operation with only 
single accommodation being provided on-site.  
 
The owners of the Mapoon DOGIT were dispersed in the early 1960s when the 
Queensland Government closed, and then destroyed, the mission at Old Mapoon. 
Most now live at New Mapoon, Napranum and at Old Mapoon, where a community 
is being reestablished under the administration of the Marpuna Corporation.  
Venture applied for a mining lease (ML 6025) in May 1988. The Mapoon Trustees 
objected to the application, but the Mining Warden recommended to the Minister for 
Resource Industries that the lease be granted and subsequently ruled that, since the 
lease did not come under the Mineral Resources Act 1989, no compensation should 
be granted to the land owners. However, Venture later found that more land was 
required for processing and infrastructure facilities, and applied for additional leases. 
These leases would come under the 1989 Act, and the company agreed to undertake 
compensation negotiations with the Trustees in relation to them and to ML 6025 as 
part of a single negotiation exercise.  
 
By mid 1994 the community was preparing for negotiations with the help of the Cape 
York Land Council. It established a Steering Committee of seven people representing 
traditional landowners, the Mapoon Trustees and Marpuna Corporation. The Steering 
Committee was determined to ensure that the environment would be protected and 
that the community would obtain an appropriate share of the benefits generated by 
Venture’s project, but it was also keen to see the project proceed, particularly because 
of the employment opportunities it was expected to create. 
 
In July 1994 the company made an offer of compensation, which involved the 
establishment of an Aboriginal employment and training program and financial 
compensation consisting of either a modest annual cash payment (adjusted for 
inflation) for 20 years or a (free) grant of shares equivalent to 2 per cent of the 
company’s current shares on issue. The company, anxious to quickly develop the 
project to take advantage of expected market opportunities, also sought the Steering 
Committee’s agreement to a timetable which would have seen compensation 
negotiations completed by August 1994. The Steering Committee rejected the offer of 
compensation as fundamentally inadequate, and also rejected the proposed timetable, 
on the grounds that it wished to have all relevant information (particularly an ESIA 
report) available before negotiations commenced.  
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In August 1994 negotiations began on financial aspects of compensation, and 
arrangements were made to undertake an ESIA. Once an Interim ESIA Report was 
available, the negotiations were extended to include other aspects of compensation. 
An Agreement was concluded in December 1994.  
 
The Mapoon-Skardon River Agreement is similar to that between CFSM and Hope 
Vale in a number of respects, for example, regarding access to mining leases and 
measures to promote cultural awareness and environmental and heritage protection. 
However, it also includes undertakings by the company to address specific 
environmental issues and potential impacts which were of concern to the community. 
It provides for the creation of bodies with similar functions to the Cape Flattery Good 
Order and Coordinating committees.  
 
Its general employment and training provisions are similar in scope to those in the 
Cape Flattery Agreement, but there are some significant differences. Venture 
undertook to ‘recognise the specific needs and preferences of different Aboriginal 
people’ in devising rotation schedules for its fly-in fly-out operations, and to upgrade 
infrastructure at Marpuna to facilitate transport of workers to the mine site. In 
addition, the company agreed to work towards employment targets for Aboriginal 
people (to be developed by the Coordinating Committee within 12 months of the start 
of operations).  Venture’s preferential employment policies will also apply to its 
contractors, an important consideration during the construction phase but also 
because mining operations will be handled by a contractor.  
 
The Agreement contains a number of provisions designed to facilitate local 
involvement in provision of goods and services to the project. Venture undertook, 
wherever possible and provided they are competitive, to engage the preferred 
tenderers of the parties to the Agreement, and to buy its goods and services from the 
local region, including from suppliers owned by Aboriginal people. It also agreed, in 
engaging contractors, to consider their willingness to enter into joint ventures with 
local Aboriginal interests. The Marpuna Corporation has recently initiated 
discussions with the ATSICDC regarding the possibility of creating a joint venture to 
operate the barging service at Skardon River.  
 
One of the most distinctive features of the Marpuna-Venture Agreement involves its 
financial provisions. A number of factors, affecting both the company and the 
community, played a role in their design. First, Skardon was a new project which 
required Venture to raise substantial loan capital, a task rendered more difficult by the 
fact that Skardon was the first major development undertaken by the company. 
Second, the project involves mineral processing as well as extraction. Third, the 
Mapoon community is attempting, with very limited resources, to reestablish itself on 
its traditional lands, and was anxious to maximise the contribution of royalty income 
to community development. Finally, there was a strong feeling among community 
members that older people who had borne the brunt of the earlier dispossession, 
should have a chance to share in income from the project.  
 
The fiscal regime consists of the following components: 
 
i. an ‘up-front’ sum payable on issue of the mining leases; this is meant to 
ensure that older people in the community obtain some immediate benefit; 
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ii. a relatively low royalty which applies during years 1 to 5 of commercial 
production, based on a fixed amount per tonne of processed output, and linked 
to the consumer price index (CPI) to protect against inflation; 
 
iii. a higher royalty from year 6 onwards, linked to weighted average prices for 
processed products, but with a ‘floor’ royalty per tonne and a minimum total 
annual payment (the latter linked to CPI); 
 
iv. a free issue of equity in the project.  
 
This regime is designed to facilitate development of the project by easing royalty 
payments during its early years. However it also seeks to ensure that the community 
will obtain substantial returns in later years. More specifically, it ensures that the 
benefit of any price increases for processed products are shared by the community 
(via the royalty formula), which will also share in any profits and capital gains 
enjoyed by shareholders (via its equity holding). Additionally and very importantly, it 
guarantees the community a specific minimum level of income as long as mining 
continues, providing it with some protection against depressed prices and facilitating 
the use of mining income in community planning and development. 
 
It is difficult to compare this fiscal regime with others negotiated in Australia during 
recent years, partly because it is more complex, partly because it is explicitly meant 
to reflect the value added which occurs in processing. However, the higher royalty 
which applies from year six is many times larger than the statutory royalty applied by 
the Queensland government to mining of raw kaolin, indicating the substantial nature 
of the payments involved.  
 
Two other features of the Marpuna-Venture Agreement warrant comment. First, local 
people were concerned that large numbers of tourists were coming onto DOGIT land 
without permission, and felt that creation of a company-assisted ranger program 
would facilitate control of tourist access, with benefits for Venture as well as the 
community. Thus the company will help to recruit and equip two Aboriginal rangers 
who, in addition to regulating tourist traffic, will play a major role in monitoring 
environmental impacts associated with Venture’s operations.  
 
The second feature relates to infrastructure development, a major concern for Mapoon 
people as they reestablish their community. Venture has agreed to upgrade an existing 
barge landing and to construct an all-weather surface for an airstrip, and will consider 
giving assistance to a range of other infrastructure projects over time.  
 
The Placer Pacific-Kalkadoon Tribal Council Agreement 
 
Placer Pacific Ltd is the developer of the Osborne copper/gold project, located 195 
km to the south-east of Mt Isa. The project is, in the words of the Agreement, ‘within 
Kalkadoon tribal lands’, but on land which has been the subject of pastoral leases and 
other forms of title. 
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Placer followed the normal practice of mining companies operating off Aboriginal 
land in Queensland and retained an archaeologist to identify any significant heritage 
sites and so comply with the Cultural Record (Landscapes Queensland and 
Queensland Estate) Act 1987. The responsible State government agency, the 
Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH), was dissatisfied with the work 
undertaken. At the same time, staff in the Social Impact Assessment Unit of 
Queensland’s Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs 
(DFSAIA) wished to encourage mining companies operating off Aboriginal land to 
go beyond legislative requirements relating to cultural heritage and deal with 
contemporary social, cultural and economic issues of concern to Aboriginal people. 
In September 1993 staff from DEH and DFSAIA met with Kalkadoon elders to 
discuss the company’s archaeological work. They decided to ask Placer to fund 
additional archaeological work (and anthropological research) under the direction of 
the Kalkadoon Tribal Council (KTC), which represents people who claim affiliation 
with Kalkadoon and Jalanga (or Yalanga) tribal lands.15  
 
Placer agreed, signing a Work Area Clearance Agreement with the KTC. This 
provided for the conduct of anthropological and archaeological research required for 
site clearance and related work; the research was funded by Placer, but the 
consultants were chosen by the KTC and traditional owners and worked under the 
KTC’s supervision. The KTC was also granted intellectual property rights over 
information collected through the research.  
 
During meetings with DFSAIA staff, Kalkadoon people had raised a number of issues 
which were of concern or interest to them, in addition to the question of heritage 
protection. These included their desire to achieve wider recognition and knowledge of 
Aboriginal culture and history in the region; access to employment and training 
opportunities at the mine; and the possibility of royalty payments by Placer to 
traditional owners.16 
 
DFSAIA staff suggested to Placer that it should enter into negotiations with the KTC 
regarding this wider range of issues. The company agreed, but immediately ruled out 
the possibility of royalty payments or of guaranteeing employment opportunities for 
local Aboriginal people. (The company planned a fly-in fly-out operation based in 
Townsville, which it may have seen as incompatible with such guarantees.) DFSAIA 
staff helped the KTC to develop a draft agreement to use as a basis for negotiations, 
which were then largely conducted by Placer and the KTC without external 
involvement. DFSAIA again played a facilitative role in organising the discussion of 
a draft final agreement by KTC members and traditional owners.17 The two parties 
negotiated what is referred to as a Final Agreement (to distinguish it from the Work 
Area Clearance Agreement). Under its terms, the KTC undertook to support Placer’s 
development of the Osborne project and its ongoing exploration work in surrounding 
areas, and formally agreed to site clearance being obtained by Placer for construction 
and operation of the project. The KTC also acknowledged: 
 
that the KTC and the people that it represents recognise that native title over 
the Osborne Project area has been extinguished and endorse their intention not 
to pursue or support any claims for title to any land affected by the Osborne 
Project.  
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Placer recognised ‘local Aboriginal people’s attachment to the land and traditional 
culture in the planning, development and decommissioning of the Osborne project’. 
The company committed $15,000 to the production of a booklet and an education kit 
documenting Aboriginal cultural heritage and attachment to land, for distribution to 
project employees and to schools in the region. Representatives from the KTC will, at 
Placer’s expense, visit the Osborne mine on an annual basis to inform employees 
about these matters. 
 
The company agreed to consult with the KTC regarding any major exploration 
drilling activities, and in particular regarding areas of significance, and to fund a 
trainee from the Aboriginal community as well as a traditional owner and a consultant 
to undertake any further site research required for exploration or mining. The 
Agreement contains details regarding the way in which the company will avoid 
disturbance at particular sites, in some cases by re-aligning or re-siting proposed 
infrastructure and mining facilities. For example, it agreed to realign its airstrip in 
order to avoid a quarry site.  
 
Placer undertook to provide the KTC, prior to commencement of construction, with 
details of all positions which would be available during construction and mine 
operation and of the experience and qualifications required and with details of all 
positions to be advertised in the press. The company agreed to establish a scholarship 
fund of $10,000 per annum ‘to enable Aboriginal people who aspire to work in the 
mining industry to complete the necessary training ...’, and to encourage and assist 
Aboriginal people who secure employment to undertake additional education and 
training.  
 
The Final Agreement has subsequently been the subject of some controversy. In 
particular, certain Aboriginal commentators have argued that the KTC and its 
advisers in the DFSAIA were too quick to acknowledge extinguishment of native 
title, given that a number of legal proceedings were then under way on the issue of 
whether granting of pastoral leases has the effect of destroying native title rights. 
They have also been critical of what they perceive as limited benefits obtained by 
Aboriginal people under the Agreement.18  DFSAIA officials argue that the 
Agreement has little effective impact on native title, both because the capacity of 
such an agreement to affect legal recognition of native title is questionable, and 
because the Agreement binds only the ‘KTC and the people it represents’, leaving 
traditional owners with the option of forming a different entity to represent them and 
using this to pursue a native title claim.  
 
In relation to the benefits yielded by the Agreement, DFSAIA staff claim that they far 
exceed what Placer was required to provide under law, and point out that other 
mining projects in the region have recently proceeded, or are currently being 
developed, without providing any benefits to Aboriginal people. They also claim that 
the Agreement establishes an important precedent in that a mining company operating 
off Aboriginal land has agreed to negotiate with Aboriginal people regarding some 
important aspects of project development.19 
 
It should be noted that Placer does not view the Agreement as representing a ‘final 
settlement’ in terms of its relationship with local Aboriginal people, but rather 
expects it to form a basis for further developing that relationship over time.20  
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Conclusion 
 
A number of general points emerge from this analysis. The agreements negotiated 
during recent years are highly varied in terms of the parties they involve (various 
combinations of Aboriginal communities and governments and mining companies); 
the range and type of provisions they include; and the relative importance of mining 
companies and governments in providing benefits to Aboriginal communities. Over 
coming years there is clearly a need to monitor the impact of the various approaches 
so as to gauge their implications for Aboriginal people and, in particular, their 
capacity to meet Aboriginal aspirations.  
 
The wide variety of approaches being utilised by Aboriginal communities and 
organisations shows very clearly their willingness to find ways of facilitating mineral 
development, while at the same time seeking to benefit from it. Indeed they have, in 
some cases, been highly inventive in this regard. This should finally discredit the 
view, promoted by sections of the media and the mining industry, that recognition of 
Aboriginal rights automatically creates barriers to resource exploitation.21 
 
The analysis also reveals a clear distinction between agreements which are negotiated 
in relation to Aboriginal land and within a legislative framework that requires 
developers to seek Aboriginal consent to mining, and those which are not. Where 
consent must be sought, agreements tend to incorporate substantial benefits for 
Aboriginal communities, especially in the key areas of royalty and other forms of 
economic benefit and of control over environmental and heritage issues. Most if not 
all of those benefits are funded by the developer, not by government. The Northern 
Land Councils ELA agreements and the Cape Flattery and Skardon River agreements 
fall into this category. Where Aboriginal consent need not be sought, benefits tend to 
be much less extensive (as in the Placer-KTC Agreement), and/or to be provided 
largely by government rather than by the developer (McArthur River).  
 
The Mt Todd Agreement appears to straddle these two categories. It provides very 
substantial benefits for the Jawoyn, but these do not include royalty-type payments or 
provisions for environmental control, and the benefits are largely funded by 
government, not the developer. This outcome reflects the unusual circumstances 
associated with the project, including the uncertainty surrounding land tenure, the 
determination of the Northern Territory Government and the Federal Government to 
see the project succeed, the strong desire of Zapopan to achieve a negotiated 
outcome, and the obvious capacity of the Jawoyn Association to exploit its 
negotiating position to the fullest.   
 
While the overall level of benefits they receive is of obvious importance to 
Aboriginal people, the question of who pays for those benefits is also significant. 
Reliance on government funding can create substantial problems because government 
policy may change very quickly and indeed from one project to another. As a result 
Aboriginal people may find themselves denied significant benefits. McArthur River, 
where the Northern Territory Government was not prepared to negotiate a package 
similar to that agreed for Mt Todd, provides a clear illustration of this problem. Of 
course legislation which mandates that companies negotiate benefits with Aboriginal 
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people can also be changed to the latter’s disadvantage (as occurred with the Land 
Rights Act in 1987). However, major changes are rare and at any given time 
legislation, unlike government policy, will tend to affect all projects in similar ways.  
 
Another major point to emerge from the analysis is that where developers have been 
required to seek Aboriginal consent to mining, Aboriginal people have demanded and 
obtained both substantial royalty payments and direct involvement in economic 
activities associated with mining such as employment and training on site, provision 
of goods and services, taking of equity in mining and related projects. Thus Hope 
Vale negotiated substantial royalties and provisions which would further extend its 
already extensive representation in the Cape Flattery workforce, Mapoon achieved 
substantial royalties as well as equity and extensive provisions regarding employment 
and contracting, and the NLC’s ELAs achieved a similar outcome.  
 
Altman has argued that the absence of royalty equivalent payments from the Mt Todd 
and McArthur River agreements: 
 
suggests that active Aboriginal participation in resource development projects 
(as joint venturers, employees or contractors) might supersede a more passive 
"rentier" role evident in all mining agreements signed since passage of the 
[Land Rights Act] (Altman 1994: 15). 
 
The more broadly-based review undertaken in this paper indicates that, where 
Aboriginal people fail to achieve substantial royalty payments, this does not reflect a 
preference on their part for more direct forms of involvement. Rather it reflects their 
relatively weak bargaining position. Thus Aboriginal people affected by Mt Todd, 
McArthur River and the Osborne project all wished to achieve royalty payments, but 
were unable to do so. Contrary to some recent press comments,22 ‘rentier income’ and 
‘direct involvement’ are not seen as alternatives; if they can, Aboriginal people will 
achieve both. 
 
These conclusions raise a more general and fundamental point. Legislative 
recognition of indigenous land rights in a form which provides indigenous 
Australians with some form of statutory control over mineral development is crucial 
in allowing them to achieve substantial benefits from mining. Reliance on the 
cooperation and goodwill of companies, or governments, does not offer an adequate 
alternative. This is not to argue for a confrontationist, non-cooperative approach 
which would militate against resource development on Aboriginal land. The Mapoon-
Venture Agreement, for example, shows very clearly that Aboriginal people can 
hammer out deals which facilitate project development. However, with a solid 
legislative base they can do so in a context which distributes bargaining power 
somewhat more evenly.  
 
A final issue involves criteria for evaluating mineral development agreements 
involving Aboriginal people. What constitutes a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ agreement? Clearly 
a simple comparison of the benefits which agreements offer to Aboriginal people is 
not helpful, since the political, legal and social contexts within which agreements are 
negotiated vary, as do the size and potential profitability of the projects involved. 
There are three criteria which can usefully be employed in evaluating agreements, 
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each of which might yield somewhat different conclusions in regard to a single 
agreement. 
 
The first involves the extent to which an agreement reflects an effective mobilisation 
of whatever bargaining power is available to Aboriginal people. According to this 
criteria, agreements which conferred limited benefits might still be evaluated 
favourably if Aboriginal bargaining positions were weak. The Placer/KTC 
Agreement, for instance, might fall into this category. Agreements which achieved 
substantial benefits despite constraints on the community’s bargaining position would 
rate very highly; the Mt Todd Agreement might be a case in point.  
 
If employed alone, however, this first criterion could create a conservative bias, since 
it might lead to endorsement of what are fundamentally inequitable distributions of 
bargaining power. A second criterion which avoids this problem involves judging the 
extent to which an agreement meets community aspirations. On this criterion an 
evaluation of the Placer/KTC and McArthur River agreements, for instance, would 
clearly be negative, since they failed to meet many of the aspirations expressed by 
traditional owners. The Cape Flattery Agreement would be evaluated much more 
favourably, since it offers substantial progress in relation to most of the demands 
expressed by Hope Vale people through the ESIA process. 
 
A third and final criterion involves the extent to which agreements serve to establish 
precedents which influence the broader negotiating environment and so the capacity 
of other indigenous groups to subsequently achieve their objectives. An agreement 
could be rated favourably on both the first and second criteria, but less favourably on 
the third if it established precedents regarded as negative by other indigenous groups. 
The Mt Todd Agreement might be a case in point. It does not contain a royalty 
component or provide for Aboriginal input on environmental management, and 
relieves the developer of most of the onus for funding benefits which flow to 
Aboriginal people, while its very high public profile and obvious advantages from a 
developer’s perspective mean that it is likely to be used as a precedent by the mining 
industry.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Mineral development agreements are defined here as contractual arrangements 
entered into by Aboriginal organisations or communities under which they 
agree to support, or not to oppose, exploration or mining activity on land they 
own or claim, and in return are offered defined benefits which would not accrue 
to them as a result of standard commercial transactions or of general 
government policy. 
 
2. This outline simplifies the relevant provisions of the Land Rights Act. For 
details see O’Faircheallaigh (1988: 81-2). 
 
3. The discussion of the NLC’s approach, and of the content of ELAs, draws on 
information provided by the Council’s Engineering and Environmental Officer 
(pers. comm., 30 March and 13 April 1995). 
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4. ‘Desert deal-makers’ (Sydney Morning Herald 14 March 1995). The discussion 
of the Mt Todd Agreement also draws on information provided by the Jawoyn 
Association’s (then) legal adviser (pers. comm., 17 May 1995).  
 
5. ‘Mabo - how two miners dealt with land claims’ (Age 3 July 1993); ‘Desert 
deal-makers’ (Sydney Morning Herald 14 March 1995); ‘Gold mining news’ 
(Sydney Morning Herald 16 April 1994). The granting of the ‘Australian 
community of the year’ award to the Jawoyn in 1995 resulted in part from its 
negotiation of the Mt Todd Agreement, and in April 1995, Zapopan was 
awarded the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation’s ‘Common ground award’ 
for its work in reconciliation between the mining industry and Aboriginal 
people.  
 
6. ‘Bipartisanship should survive Mabo joust’ (Age 16 January 1993).  
 
7. ‘Zapopan’s model deal’ (Australian Financial Review 20 January 1993); 
‘Jawoyn people get down to business’ (Business Review Weekly 16 July 1993), 
‘Aborigines sign exploration deal’ (Age 15 April 1994).  
 
8. Thus Mr Tickner, for example, stated that the Agreement ‘above all else ... 
shows that the Mabo decision can be a powerful force for constructive change 
in Australia’ (‘Bipartisanship should survive Mabo joust’, Age 16 January 
1993).  
 
9. In the end these benefits were not taken up by the Jawoyn Association, partly 
because it concluded that sufficient educational opportunities were available to 
its members from other channels. It appears they were subsequently ‘traded off’ 
with Zapopan in return for additional expenditure on its employment and 
training activities, including the recruitment of an additional Aboriginal 
employment and training officer.   
 
10. ‘Mining company in joint venture with Aborigines - Henry Walker Group Ltd’ 
(Australian Financial Review 13 July 1993); ‘Henry Walker - Territorian 
broadens its horizons’ (Sydney Morning Herald 18 April 1994). 
 
11. ‘Mabo - how two miners dealt with land claims’ (Age 3 July 1993). However 
some expenditure will now be directed towards Aboriginal rather than non-
Aboriginal people, in part because of the company’s Aboriginal employment 
and training program.  
 
12. ‘PM under fire over mine move’ (Age 29 May 1993); ‘Aborigines accuse 
Keating on mine deal’ (Age 28 May 1993).  
 
13. ‘Blacks baulk at deal on huge NT mine’ (Age 26 June 1993).  
 
14. ‘Aborigines share in MIM barge contract’ (Australian Financial Review 10 
December 1993). 
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15. Information on the involvement of the DFSAIA and the DEH was provided by 
staff of the former’s Social Impact Assessment Unit (SIAU), through provision 
of relevant documentation and via personal communications (19 May 1995). 
 
16. Personal communications, SIAU staff (19 May 1995). According to DFSAIA 
staff, traditional owners realised that the likelihood of achieving royalty 
payments was remote, given that the project was not on Aboriginal land. 
 
17. Personal communications, SIAU staff (19 May 1995). 
 
18. This view was expressed, for example, by a number of Aboriginal people who 
participated in a joint Gulf - Peninsula Mining Workshop held at Kuranda on 8-
9 May 1995. 
 
19. Personal Communication, SIAU staff (19 May 1995). 
 
20. Personal Communications, SIAU staff (19 May 1995); Waluwarra land council 
staff (9 May 1995).  
 
21. See, for example, ‘Mining, a wounded Goliath, takes to its heels’ (Australian 
Financial Review 17 February 1995). 
 
22. See, for instance, ‘A Lesson in mutual benefits - Mabo’ (Australian Financial 
Review 5 August 1993).  
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